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Recent policy statements and media reports would lead one to believe that there is some 
connection between ‘tax havens’ and the global financial crisis. Unfortunately that 
connection is rarely explained. Offshore financial centres (OFCs) are certainly relevant to 
the discredited international financial system, but their role tends to be exaggerated or 
misconstrued. 
The G20 Communiqué issued at the London 2009 Summit stated that ‘major failures in 
the financial sector and in financial regulation and supervision’ were fundamental causes 
of the financial crisis, and few informed observers would disagree. As one aspect of their 
commitment to strengthen financial regulation and supervision, the G20 leaders agreed 
that they would: 
… take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens. We 
stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public finances and financial 
systems. The era of banking secrecy is over. We note that the OECD has today 
published a list of countries assessed by the Global Forum against the 
international standard for exchange of tax information. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) itself draws 
some connection between tax havens and the financial crisis when it states: ‘Removing 
practices that facilitate tax evasion is part of a broader drive to clean up one of the more 
controversial sides of a globalised economy’. But these statements leave unexplained the 
exact role, if any, of tax havens in the crisis. 
To understand this issue further one must distinguish among three concepts: tax evasion, 
tax avoidance, and financial regulation avoidance. OFCs have been popular with the 
financial industry in facilitating avoidance (and in some cases evasion) of both taxes and 
regulatory requirements of larger countries. 
TAX EVASION 
Tax evasion is criminal behaviour – for example, deliberate concealment of taxable 
income. In most countries evasion is punishable by fines, imprisonment or both. A 
notorious example is the 2008 investigation of high net-worth individuals from the UK, 
Germany, US and elsewhere who are alleged to have evaded tax by funnelling billions to 
secretive Liechtenstein banks.  
Developed countries, being justifiably unhappy with international tax evasion, have on 
various occasions sought to ‘blacklist’ tax havens. The G20 Communiqué refers to the 
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OECD’s latest progress report on jurisdictions which have or have not made progress in 
implementing its ‘internationally agreed tax standard’. The essence of this standard is that 
states agree to exchange tax information when requested for the administration and 
enforcement of the requesting state’s domestic tax laws. The standard is aimed squarely 
at transparent information exchange for countering specific cases of tax evasion. It has 
nothing to do with either international tax avoidance or financial regulation, and no one 
suggests seriously that evasion was a cause of the financial crisis.  
TAX AVOIDANCE 
Tax avoidance (or tax ‘planning’) is a term used loosely by many commentators but its 
legal meaning is distinct from tax evasion. It refers to structuring one’s affairs so as to 
reduce one’s tax liability within the limits of the law. A given form of tax avoidance is 
legal unless and until otherwise determined by a court. A notable example of tax 
avoidance is a multinational enterprise choosing to locate intellectual property in a 
subsidiary based in low tax jurisdiction. Such activity is usually legal, yet some may 
regard it as unethical given that it can substantially reduce tax contributions and therefore 
deplete public finances. Commentators have differing views on whether a given form of 
avoidance is legitimate or illegitimate, depending on their commercial, political and 
ethical position. When losses of large financial institutions such as Citigroup, AIG and 
RBS are met at the expense of domestic taxpayers, the tax avoidance activities of these 
institutions become more controversial than ever. As with evasion, however, tax 
avoidance cannot be blamed for the near collapse of the financial system. 
FINANCIAL REGULATION AVOIDANCE 
Financial regulation avoidance, sometimes conducted through tax havens, is more closely 
linked to the recognised causes of the credit crunch. In particular, OFCs with lax 
regulation were often home to Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), Conduits and other 
off-balance sheet and off-budget vehicles, which were at the heart of events triggering the 
crisis. SIVs in particular invested mainly in the asset-backed securities at the very centre 
of the credit crunch. In August 2007, SIVs were the first institutions to encounter 
problems when liquidity suddenly disappeared from the wholesale asset-backed 
commercial paper market exposed to US subprime mortgages. 
The fact that many of these entities were located in OFCs has created confusion about the 
role of tax havens in the crisis. The location of off-balance sheet and off-budget vehicles 
in offshore jurisdictions certainly does not contribute to the transparency of the system. 
But the problems experienced by SIVs at the onset of the crisis were not due to their 
offshore location but to their off-balance sheet status (leading to information failures and 
low capital ratios) and their business model (they use short-dated commercial paper to 
fund investments in longer-dated assets). Moreover, what is now widely defined as the 
‘shadow banking system’ is lightly regulated not only offshore but also in the main 
onshore financial centres such as London and New York.  
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LOOKING FORWARD 
OFCs may be tax havens, regulatory havens, or both. They have long been used for a 
variety of purposes, including tax evasion, tax avoidance and regulatory avoidance. 
Taking action against global tax evasion and improving standards in global financial 
regulation are both laudable goals, but they are different goals. Promoting exchange of 
information for combating tax evasion has little to do with the financial crisis. Improving 
financial regulation is very relevant to the financial crisis but has little to do with 
enforcement of tax. Moreover, success in either of these goals is unlikely to have any 
effect on international tax avoidance. Only substantial developments in the way 
international income is taxed will change that. 
 
